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1 Introduction
Contests, in which individuals have the opportunity to expend costly resources in order to
affect the probabilities of winning a prize, are ubiquitous in everyday life. Examples include
promotion tournaments, political races, rent-seeking, elections, sports, and various market
competitions such as advertising or patent races (see Konrad (2009) for a broader discussion).
In many of these situations, a contest designer plans a contest with certain objectives in mind.
In sports, promotional tournaments, and social contests with positive externalities - to name
a few - maximizing total effort is usually the central objective.
The potential participants of a contest do not necessarily have even abilities or efficiencies.
A sufficiently uneven contest, however, has several disadvantages. It may fail to give a level
playing field to a historically disadvantaged or minority group. As a result, contestants from a
minority group may decide not to participate in the contest. It can also fail to elicit significant
efforts from weaker participants if they perceive their probability of winning to be too small
(Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Runkel (2006)). Knowing this, a stronger participant also has
limited incentives to exert high effort, and the overall effort exerted in a sufficiently uneven
contest is usually low. Hence, ex-ante differences in efficiencies or abilities among participants
is a matter of concern for a contest designer interested in maximizing total effort.
In this context, Brown (2011) empirically finds that the presence of a ‘superstar’ - in this
case, an in-form Tiger Woods - serves to reduce the absolute performance (and implicitly,
the effort) of his fellow professional golfers. Sunde (2009) finds a similar effect in women’s
professional tennis.
It would be natural, therefore, to conclude that a contest designer should aim to level
the playing field, since it will make the contestants exert more effort. Handicapping - where
stronger participants are a priori weakened - is one such tool that is widely used in sports,
promotional tournaments and other types of contests. Firms that use contests as a motiva-
tional tool often handicap those of superior ability, or give head-starts to those with inferior
ability. Similarly, expenditure in political campaigns is often capped - thereby handicapping
the candidate with the richest connections (Che and Gale (1998)). It is also common to
observe handicapping of an outsider in a local procurement auction, or in internal promo-
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tional tournaments (Chan (1996)). One extreme policy used to handicap the most efficient
players is to exclude them altogether (Baye et al. (1993)). All these designs are implemented
essentially to ‘level the playing field’ for all the participants, to rescale the ex-ante likelihood
of winning for all the participants, and to incentivize participants to exert higher levels of
efforts in the contest. In sports this is known as ‘competitive balance’ and is an important
component when designing sports tournaments (Szymanski (2003), Fort and Maxcy (2003)).
Economists have also studied and analyzed the effects of handicapping in the context of
affirmative action. Overall, both theoretical and applied results support an employment of
affirmative action tools in the interests of higher effort as well as equality. Fryer and Loury
(2005) show that profile-specific affirmative actions can increase effort, and reduce inequality.
Fu (2006) shows that such policies may improve incoming test scores for an academic institu-
tion, while still admitting students from minority backgrounds. Similar results are confirmed
in different contest structures and information settings by Franke (2012a) and Calsamiglia et
al. (2013). Kirkegaard (2012) lays down mechanisms by which an affirmative action policy
can also improve effort. Empirically, the issue of levelling the playing field is supported by
Schotter and Weigelt (1992), who run a laboratory experiment with equal opportunity pro-
grams and affirmative actions. They show that such policies benefit the disadvantaged group
and at the same time increase the effort levels of all contestants. Along the same lines as
Brown (2011), Franke (2012b) investigates the area of amateur golf tournaments and shows
that handicapping the efficient players elicits higher effort in the tournament.
Implementation of such policies, however, is not without danger. Contests between par-
ticipants of comparable ability may see more effort diverted to destruction (i.e., sabotage),
rather than production.1 In a political race this may take the form of negative smear cam-
paigning, rather than a positive focus on the issues (Skaperdas and Grofman (1995)). In a
1Sabotage in static and dynamic contests has been considered by a number of authors (e.g. Lazear (1989),
Konrad (2000), Chen (2003), Kräkel (2005), Amegashie and Runkel (2007), Münster (2007), Soubeyran (2009)
and Gürtler and Münster (2010)). Although experimental evidence has been forthcoming (e.g. Harbring et
al. (2007), Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) and Carpenter et al. (2010)), there has been relatively little
field analysis. Notable exceptions include the work of Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2014), del Corral et al.
(2010), Balafoutas et al. (2012) and Deutscher et al. (2013) who examine fouls, as a form of sabotage, in
sports. Please see Chowdhury and Gürtler (2013) for a comprehensive survey on sabotage in contests.
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firm, sabotage could involve the spreading of malicious rumours about a colleague (Lazear
(1989)). In markets, this may mean negative advertising or even introducing ways to increase
rivals’ costs (Salop and Scheffman (1983)). On a football (soccer) pitch, this may mean using
fouls to stop rival teams scoring (Deutscher et al. (2013)). Regardless of the setting, any
increase in sabotage is to the detriment of the contest designer. Up until now, however,
no study has attempted to investigate whether the policies used to elicit higher effort, or
reduce inequality, actually increase sabotage in a contest. In this paper we aim to answer
this question.
We analyse an environment in which there is both handicapping and sabotage, by ex-
amining 19,635 horse races run in the U.K. in 2011 and 2012.2 Of these, 11,766 (59.9%)
are handicap races. In handicap races, horses within a range of abilities are permitted to
take part, but superior horses are given heavier weights so that all horses have a similar
probability of winning.3. The BHA Guide to Handicapping states that
‘A handicap is a race for which horses are allotted weight, based on their ability on the
racecourse, to try to equalize their chances of winning... The Handicapper hopes to make the
race exciting and competitive for the owners and racegoers’
There is also a second ingredient to our data. The BHA investigates ‘interference’ between
horses during each race. Interference can include one horse knocking into another horse, a
horse forcing another off their racing line, and even cases of a jockey stealing another jockey’s
whip during the race.4 While interfering with another horse, the jockey is exerting effort to
reduce the likelihood of the victim winning. Interference is, in other words, sabotage. In
2011 and 2012 alone, there were 1,099 cases of interference.
2Horse-racing has been used by other authors to examine contest theory. For example, Lynch (2005) uses
Arabian horse-racing data to examine how the structuring of the prize schedule, and the translation of effort
into reward, affects aggregate effort in contests. Coffey and Maloney (2010) use horse and dog racing data
to disentangle the effect of incentives and selection on effort in contests.
3Full details on the handicapping system in horse racing can be found on the British Horse-Racing Au-
thority website http://www.britishhorseracing.com
4Lester Piggott is the most (in)famous jockey to commit such an offense, stealing the whip of Alain
Lequeux in a race in France in 1979 (The Times, November 15th 2008). He later explained that Alain ‘did
not seem to mind and [had] got no chance [of winning]’ (The Guardian, 14th December 2003).
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We find, first of all, that handicapping does its job in levelling the field: favourites (often,
the best horses) are less likely to win handicap races than they are to win non-handicap races.
Further, the betting market anticipates this: the standard deviation in pre-race odds is lower
in handicap races than non-handicap races (i.e., more horses have a shot at winning). Second,
and the key result in our paper, is that participants in handicap races are substantially more
likely to commit sabotage than those competing in non-handicap races. The incidence of
sabotage is particularly high in close handicap races (as measured by the standard deviation
in pre-race odds), and even extends to close non-handicap races. In other words, a levelling
of the field appears to increase the likelihood of destruction in contest environments. Finally,
we find that there are strong incentives for jockeys to employ destructive strategies as it
helps the saboteur to improve his/her final rank and to win the race. The enactment of
sabotage gains the saboteur 1.43 places, on average, relative to the betting market’s pre-race
expectations of their finishing position. Combining these results, we conclude that if not
taken care of, sabotage may partially offset the benefits, in positive effort inducement and
equality, that arise with tools such as handicapping.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a theoretical
benchmark of sabotage in contests. In Section 3 we outline the data relating to handicapping
and interference, and in Section 4 we conduct our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Theoretical Benchmark
We introduce a simple model to show how actions that are intended to reduce ex-ante effi-
ciency difference among players may increase sabotage. We use a tournament model with
sabotage similar to Lazear (1989). There are two risk-neutral players, i and j, who compete
for a prize of common value v. Player i can either expend productive effort ei that improves
his own probability of winning; or can exert destructive sabotage si that reduces the effort
level of their rival, and as a result the probability of their rival winning. Furthermore, Player
i has ability ai that is given exogenously. Without loss of generality assume ai > aj, i.e.,
Player i is a-priori more efficient than Player j. This type of specification is common while
considering ’unfair’ contests and analysing the effects of asymmetry or affirmative action
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tools, while keeping other effects the same (see, for instance, Schotter and Weigelt (1992, pp.
517) or Gürtler and Gürtler (2015)).
Let us now denote this a-priori efficiency difference as 4a = ai − aj. The final output yi
produced by player i is given as
yi = ai + ei − αsj + i
for α < 1, and i is random noise. The output function is analogous for Player j. Exerting
effort and sabotage are both costly. Consider the total cost function as:
ci = c(ei, si)
The cost function has the following properties: c(0, 0) = 0, c1 > 0, c11 > 0, c2 > 0,
c22 > 0, c12 > 0, ensuring a standard convex shape.5 We further assume enough convexity
and Inada-type conditions that ensure the existence of an interior solution. Although we
do not explicitly model possible punishment as a consequence of detected sabotage, the cost
function implicitly incorporates exactly that. The convexity can imply a higher likelihood of
detection with sabotage, and also a higher level of punishment.
Following the standard procedures in Tournament models, the player with the highest
output wins the prize. Thus, the contest success function can be written as:
pi =

1 if yi > yj
1
2 if yi = yj
0 if yi < yj
Hence, the pay-off function for Player i can be written as
pii = piv − c(ei, si)
= p((ai + ei − αsj + i)− (aj + ej − αsi + j) > 0)v − c(ei, si)
= p((4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si)) > (j − i))v − c(ei, si)
5Here a single subscript means first order partial derivative with the first or the second argument, and a
double subscript means a second order own or cross partial.
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= G(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))v − c(ei, si)
where G(.) is the CDF of i − j, with unimodal PDF g(.).
Player i will try to maximize payoff pii with respect to ei and si. The first order conditions
are given as
∂pii
∂ei
= g(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))v − ∂c
∂ei
= 0 (1)
∂pii
∂si
= αg(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))v − ∂c
∂si
= 0 (2)
Similarly the pay-off function for Player j:
pij = (1−G(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si)))v − c(ej, sj)
And the first order conditions to maximize pay-off are:
∂pij
∂ej
= g(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))v − ∂c
∂ej
= 0 (3)
∂pij
∂sj
= αg(4a+ (ei − ej)− α(sj − si))v − ∂c
∂sj
= 0 (4)
From (1) and (3), we observe that ∂c
∂ei
= ∂c
∂ej
. Similarly, from (2) and (4), we obtain
∂c
∂si
= ∂c
∂sj
. It follows that there exists a symmetric equilibrium, with e∗i = e∗j = e∗ and
si∗ = sj∗ = s∗. The above first-order conditions then simplify to
g(4a)v = ∂c(e∗,s∗)
∂ei
and
g(4a)v = ∂c(e∗,s∗)
∂si
.
The convexity conditions of the cost function, c11 > 0 and c22 > 0, then imply that both
e∗ and s∗ are increasing in g(4a).
Recall that 4a = a1 − a2 is the a-priori efficiency difference. In a contest it may be
possible for the designer to reduce the efficiency difference either by employing handicapping
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(decreasing ai) or by allowing head-starts (increasing aj). In either case, 4a goes down
and, given the shape of the PDF, g(4a) increases. This results in an expected increase in
equilibrium effort e∗. It is also simple to show that the probability that the most efficient
player wins decreases. However, as a by-product, the contest designer is also faced with a
higher level of sabotage s∗.
We have already discussed that some tools - such as handicapping - are implemented to
increase equilibrium efforts. However, it is clear that it is also in the interest of players to
increase their employment of sabotage when such tools are utilised. The act of sabotage is
detrimental to the other players, the designer and even agents unrelated to the contest (see
Chowdhury and Gürtler (2013) for a detailed discussion of this). Hence, while our model
indicates that an implementation of handicapping may help to achieve certain objectives of
the designer, it also increases the level of sabotage. Such sabotage may lessen or, in an
extreme case, offset the benefits achieved from the original increase in productive effort.
In the next two sections we present field evidence to verify these predictions. We first
establish that handicapping fulfils its objective of levelling the playing field. We then show
that, as a by-product, sabotage goes up. We also show that sabotage helps in the winning
of contests.
3 Data
We obtained data on 19,635 U.K. horse races in 2011 and 2012 from Betwise (www.betwise.co.uk),
a betting information company. This data includes information on the time and date of each
race, the class of the race (which ranges from 1 (top) to 7 (bottom)), the number of horses
in each race, the prize money on offer to the winner, and the distance over which the race is
run. In addition, we have the type of race (e.g. flat - i.e., a standard race, and jump - i.e.,
a hurdle race or steeplechase) and whether or not the race was a handicap. Please see the
BHA Guide to Racing for more details on the types of racing in the U.K..
Supplementing this race data, we have information on each of the horses competing. This
includes the age of the horse, and also the bookmaker odds at the time the race begins,
otherwise known as the starting price. Summary statistics on race and horse data can
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be found in Table 1. As expected, the standard deviation of the implied win probability
(calculated from the starting price) is larger for non-handicap races than for handicap races.
This reflects the fact that without handicapping, certain horses have very little chance of
winning. Reflecting the uncertainty created by handicapping, the favourite wins 41.43% of
non-handicap races, but only 27.5% of handicap races.
[Insert Table 1 here]
We also require data related to interference. The BHA entrust multiple race stewards to
investigate and punish cases of interference. Information on all steward’s enquiries relating
to interference can be found on the BHA webpage.6 Details of the procedures followed by
the stewards can be found in BHA Manual B Schedule 6. Below is a typical example of the
output displayed after an enquiry, in this case from a race at Towcester on 10th January
2011.
‘The Stewards held an enquiry into possible interference approaching the final flight. They
found that the winner, BADGERS COVE (IRE) ridden by Charlie Poste, had interfered with
OVERNIGHT FAME, ridden by Denis O’Regan, placed second. They found Poste in breach
of Rule (B)54.1 and guilty of careless riding in that he allowed his mount to drift to the right.
They suspended him for 2 days as follows: Monday, 24th and Tuesday, 25th January 2011’.
If we assume handicap races are more competitive, horses will spend more time in close
proximity to each other in these races. We are therefore keen to distinguish between cases
of accidental interference (which may occur as a result of this proximity) and intentional
interference. The BHA procedures allow us to do precisely that. Consider the following case
of accidental interference from a race at Wolverhampton also on 10th January 2011. Such
cases are not classified as sabotage in our data-set.
‘The Stewards noted that DAUNTSEY PARK (IRE), unplaced, had interfered with the
winner, BLACK COFFEE, at approximately five furlongs out, but after viewing a video
6www.britishhorseracing.com/resources/about/whatwedo/disciplinary/stewardsEnquiries.asp.
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recording of the incident, they were satisfied that it was caused by accident. They therefore
took no further action’.
We married the data on guilty interference with the race and horse data described in Table
1. We only analysed data from racetracks with at least one incident of interference over the
two year sample. This was to ensure that racetracks outside of the BHA’s jurisdiction, or
racetracks with overly lenient stewards, did not cloud our analysis. In our sample from 2011
and 2012, there were 1,099 cases of interference, of which 787 occurred in handicap races.
0.46% of competitors were guilty of interference in non-handicap races, but this rises to 0.68%
for handicap races. In the following section, we present our more formal analysis. For clarity,
we will now refer to interference as sabotage.
4 Analysis
Our analysis consists of three parts. First, we investigate whether handicapping - similar
to other tools that level the playing field - serves its purpose and creates relatively even
races. Then we compare the frequency of sabotage in handicap and non-handicap races, and
attempt to establish the underlying mechanism for any differences. Finally, we investigate
the effect of sabotage on the saboteur’s performance.
We start with a testable hypothesis on handicapping and the likelihood of the horse with
the highest efficiency (the favourite) winning. We investigate whether the favourite wins with
higher probability in handicap or non-handicap contests.
Hypothesis 1. Handicap races have more uncertain outcomes - both ex-ante and ex-post
- compared to non-handicap races.
To test this hypothesis, in Table 2 we regress an indicator variable equalling 1 if the
favourite wins the race, and 0 otherwise, on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse
was running in a handicap race, and 0 otherwise. As one race is one observation at this
stage, we cluster standard errors at the race meeting level (there are typically 5-6 races at
each meeting). If the favourite is less likely to win a handicap, this would suggest that
handicapping creates greater uncertainty in the race outcome. Indeed, in Regression 1 this
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is the result we find with significance at the 0.1% level. In Regression 2 we include control
variables, related to the race, and find the result to be robust.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Whether the favourite won the race is a relatively blunt measure of the uncertainty of the
race outcome, as it considers only the top horse in each race. Furthermore, it is an ex-post
measure of uncertainty, and we would also like an ex-ante measure to test Hypothesis 1.
Therefore, in Table 3 we use the standard deviation of implied win probability within a race
as the dependent variable. This measure incorporates data on all horses in the race. If the
standard deviation is low, this implies that the race is relatively even, as the horses start
the race at similar odds. As expected, we find that handicap races are considerably more
even than non-handicap races (significant at the 0.1% level) and this result is robust to the
inclusion of race control variables. In addition we find that flat races have lower standard
deviations in implied win probability (significant at the 0.1% level), and therefore it can now
be argued that the outcome of flat races are more uncertain than the outcome of jump races
(at least ex-ante). It is this uncertainty - which arises either due to the nature of the contest,
or due to the handicapping design - that we believe will incentivize sabotage.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Another way to consider the effect of handicapping on the full spectrum of horses - and
indeed to incorporate race results in addition to race forecasts - is to calculate the correlation
between a horse’s predicted finishing position and their actual finishing position. This can
then be compared for handicap and non-handicap sub-samples. A horse’s predicted finishing
position can be inferred by comparing the odds of all horses in each race. Those with the
shortest odds are predicted to finish first, those with the second shortest odds are predicted
to finish second, and so on. We find that the correlation between a horse’s predicted position
and their actual position is 0.5138 for handicap races, while the same correlation for non-
handicap races is 0.6577. Although the outcome of handicap races are not perfectly random,
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this is further evidence that handicapping does indeed serve its purpose of making the contest
more uncertain.
Having demonstrated that handicapping fulfils its task of levelling the field, we now focus
on whether sabotage is more prevalent in handicap contests. We introduce the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Sabotage is employed more in a handicap contest compared to a non-
handicap contest.
To test this hypothesis, in Table 4 we present two logit regressions relating to sabotage.
These regressions incorporate each horse performance, and consider horse-specific variables
such as age and implied win probability, rather than considering only race features as before.
We therefore now cluster standard errors at the race-level. In Regression 1, an indicator
variable, equalling 1 if the horse/jockey was a saboteur and 0 otherwise, is regressed on an
indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse was racing in a handicap race. The relationship
is positive and significant (at the 0.1% level). In Regression 2, we include control variables.
Once again, the relationship is positive and significant (at the 0.1% level), and gives an odds
ratio of 1.57 of sabotage in a handicap race relative to a non-handicap race. In other words,
destructive effort is clearly more prevalent in handicap contests relative to non-handicap
contests.
A closer look at our control variables also reveals that sabotage is more of an issue in
shorter races, increases with prize money (though much of this effect is captured by the
class of the race), is often carried out by horses in the prime of their careers (witness the
concave relationship between horse age and the propensity to engage in sabotage), and is
predominantly carried out by horses/jockeys with a good chance of victory (implied win
probability is positive and significant). However, most of these effects have weaker statistical
significance than the effect of handicapping. It is interesting to observe that sabotage occurs
more often, even after controlling for other factors, in flat races. It can be recalled from Table
3 that flat races were, like handicap races, relatively even contests.
[Insert Table 4 here]
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One problem with our empirical set-up is that, even though the same jockeys will perform
in both handicap and non-handicap races, they are not randomly assigned across races.
One option, to partially circumvent this problem, is to exploit the abundant variation in
the closeness of both handicap and non-handicap races. Handicap races will differ in their
closeness, perhaps depending, amongst other things, on the competence of the handicapper.
If the handicapper does a poor job, or if important information on the quality of horses arrives
after the weights are decided, horses will go off at vastly different odds. Similarly, certain
non-handicap races may be very closely matched without a handicapper’s intervention. To
get closer to establishing that handicapping drives sabotage, we should examine whether
close races - both of the handicap and non-handicap variety - attract more sabotage than
less close races.
Our measure of the closeness of the race - ex-ante - is the standard deviation of implied
win probability (as used in Table 3). In Regression 1 of Table 5, we regress our saboteur
indicator on this standard deviation plus the other control variables used in Table 4 (including
the handicap indicator). As expected, we find that sabotage is indeed more prevalent in close
contests (i.e. when the standard deviation of implied win probability in the race is low). In
Regressions 2 and 3 we exclude the handicap race indicator and instead regress our saboteur
indicator on the remaining variables, but this time for sub-samples of handicap and non-
handicap races. In Regression 2 we find that there is a greater prevalence of sabotage in close
handicap contests (compared to less close handicap contests) with significance at the 5%
level. In Regression 3 we find that close non-handicap races are also aﬄicted by higher levels
of sabotage than less close non-handicap contests (with significance at the 1% level). In other
words, the closer the race ex-ante, the more likely we are to observe sabotage, regardless of
whether the race is a handicap or not. This result gives us greater confidence that it is in fact
the closeness created by handicapping that drives higher levels of sabotage in those races.
Does the prevalence of sabotage in close contests reflect the greater returns to sabotage
in such races, as the model in Section 2 implies? Or, are competitors equally keen to engage
in sabotage across all races, but just find that close races give them the necessary proximity?
These questions have important implications. If the former is true, then it suggests that
contest designers should avoid levelling the playing field for fear of increasing destructive
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effort. If the latter is true, greater importance should be given to keeping competitors
(whether of even or uneven abilities) apart.
It is difficult to disentangle these two mechanisms in the data, but one option is to examine
which types of competitors are engaging in sabotage. If all competitors in handicap races
can be found engaging in sabotage, then the proximity created by even races may be the key
factor. If, on the other hand, top horses are disproportionately responsible for sabotage in
handicap races, then this suggests that it is the greater returns to sabotage in handicap races
that lies behind our earlier results. Note that handicapping will just as likely keep those
trailing as those leading together during a race. The key question is whether those trailing
are just as likely to engage in sabotage.
It turns out that the analysis in Table 5 can help to answer this question. In Regressions
2 and 3 we separated out handicap and non-handicap races, with the primary aim of seeing
whether close races - whether with a handicap design or not - were subject to more sabotage.
Yet, looking at the coefficient associated with implied win probability, and comparing it across
handicap and non-handicap sub-samples - provides insight for our more recent questions. In
both types of races it is the stronger horses that disproportionately engage in sabotage
(see the positive coefficient associated with implied win probability). What’s more, the
coefficient is larger for the handicap sub-sample, suggesting that, once you control for other
race characteristics, sabotage is even more concentrated amongst the leading runners and
riders in handicaps. Rather than high levels of sabotage simply being due to new-found
proximity, it appears that sabotage in handicap races is largely driven by the greater returns
to sabotage in these races.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Our final aim in this study is to quantify the effect of sabotage on contest outcomes. It is
one aspect to establish that handicap contests are more susceptible to sabotage, but whether
this destructive practice actually works in the saboteur’s favour is still not clear. We test the
success of sabotage in our next hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3. Employment of sabotage improves the performance of the saboteur in
contests.
In Table 6a we regress an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse/jockey won the race,
and 0 otherwise, on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse/jockey was a saboteur,
and on the implied win probability of the horse (as inferred from the starting price). We
find that sabotage does indeed improve the saboteur’s chances of victory (significant at the
0.1% level) relative to the betting market’s pre-race expectations. The coefficient associated
with the saboteur indicator variable implies an odds ratio of 2.95 of a saboteur winning
the race relative to a non-saboteur with the same pre-race prospects. This result is most
vividly captured in Figure 1. We plot the average win indicator (i.e. the win frequency) for
saboteurs, victims and uninvolved third parties. Compared to the implied win probabilities,
and using third parties as a reference point, saboteurs win more often than their pre-race
odds would suggest, while the prospects of victims are clearly hampered by the saboteur’s
actions. This is particularly apparent for lower implied win probabilities, where there are
more observations and where much of the noise is averaged out.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In the remainder of Table 6a we examine whether the effect is more pronounced in
handicap/non-handicap/jump and flat races. While sabotage is, initially, more likely to
be effective in handicap contests as the races are close, we would expect competitors to use
sabotage in both types of contests until the marginal impact is equal across each type of race.
Indeed, this appears to be the case as the coefficients across handicap and non-handicap races
are similar. The effect of sabotage on the saboteur’s win prospects are higher, however, in
jump races compared to flat races, suggesting that there are some unexploited opportunities
for sabotage in the former.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
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One problem with our initial choice of performance measure (whether the horse won the
race), is that the out-performance of the saboteur could be confounded with the well-known
favourite-longshot bias. This is the empirical regularity - dating from Griffith (1949) - that the
returns to betting on favourites exceed the returns to betting on longshots.7. This means that
favourites (longshots) will win more (less) often than their odds suggest. As saboteurs are
disproportionately favoured horses (see Table 4), the favourite-longshot bias could generate
the results in the top panel of Table 6 without sabotage actually being beneficial for the
saboteur.
To circumvent this issue we also used the following measure of performance used by Brown
(2012):
Performance = PredictedF inishingPosition− ActualF inishingPosition
NumberofHorsesinRace
(5)
The predicted finishing position is constructed by ordering the horses in each race by
their odds. Those with the shortest odds are predicted to finish first, those with the second
shortest odds are predicted to finish second, and so on. If Performance is negative, the horse
has underperformed, while a positive Performance signals out-performance. This measure
allows us to capture the effect of sabotage on the full spectrum of horses, unlike the previous
specification which focused only on the identity of one horse (the winner). This measure also
has a negative bias when it comes to favoured horses. For example, a horse predicted to finish
first can only under-perform (vice versa, a horse predicted to finish last can only outperform).
Therefore, in each of the following regressions we control for the predicted percentile of the
horse. For example, a horse predicted to finish 4th out of 14 horses would have a predicted
percentile of 100 ∗ (4/14) = 28.57th.
From Table 6b we can see that the saboteur does indeed gain places (significant at the
0.1% level). Judging by the size of the coefficients - and the average number of horses
in each race (see Table 1) - the saboteur finishes, on average, 1.43 positions higher than
betting market expectations as a result of their actions. We also replicate this analysis
7See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2008) for a survey of the explanations for the bias.
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for handicap/non-handicap/jump and flat race sub-samples. The overall result is captured
in Figure 2, where we average the performance measure for saboteurs, victims and third
parties for each predicted percentile (rounded to the nearest whole number) across the full
sample. Saboteurs significantly outperform expectations, while victims suffer relative to
pre-race expectations. This positional gain explains why saboteurs sabotage.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
5 Conclusion
Contests are a family of games where players make costly sunk investments in order to win
rewards. There are very many situations in the field in which contests are employed to select
winners for rewards. Tools such as handicapping, head-starts, caps on effort etc. are often
used in political and economic contests, sometimes for ethical reasons (e.g. in affirmative
actions), but also to increase the aggregate effort of unevenly able participants. The existing
literature show that these tools, in general, are capable of achieving the objectives of the
designer.
In this paper we introduce, for the first time, analyses of sabotage behaviour in contests
that use a handicapping tool to level the playing field. We show theoretically that imple-
mentation of such policies indeed increases equilibrium effort. However, as a by-product,
incidences of sabotage also increase. We utilise a unique data set from the British horse-
racing industry to empirically verify this second prediction. We demonstrate that partici-
pants indeed display a greater propensity for destructive acts in contests where handicapping
is implemented.
It has previously been shown that effort, particularly from weaker participants, is higher
in even contests (see, for example, Che and Gale (1998)). Studies such as Tsoulouhas et al.
(2007) argue against such policies - common in workplace environments (Pfeifer (2011)) - as
they may reduce the ability of the future players in a repeated setting. However, our results
shed light on the possible harmful effects of levelling the contest even in a static setting, as
it appears to incentivize sabotage.
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Our results are of particular interest in settings such as workplaces, political campaigns,
and sports, in which it is possible for players to sabotage rivals. (Contests in which players
cannot access their rivals - e.g. applications to colleges, innovation tournaments etc. - will
be safe from the implications of our results). This means that capping campaign budgets in
political races, handicapping ‘superstar’ workers in internal labour markets, or giving head-
starts to local companies may even result in lower welfare than the status-quo.8 As there are
both benefits, in terms of higher effort, and damage - in terms of sabotage - in levelling the
playing field, our results also suggest that an optimal level of handicapping could be chosen
to elicit the highest net constructive effort in a contest.
8Several designs popularly used to reduce sabotage (see Chowdhury and Gürtler (2013)) are not necessarily
employable in every setting. Sabotage might be reduced by introducing detection procedure and punishments,
but these also incur individual and social costs.
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Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Races All (N=19635) Hcap (N=11766) Non Hcap (N=7869) Jump (N=6631) Flat (N=13004)
No. of Runners 9.33262 9.793898 8.642903 8.811793 9.598201
(3.448693) (3.427932) (3.363705) (3.586575) (3.345284)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 9.661175 7.395767 13.04849 9.102513 9.946048
(33.85377) (17.34128) (48.89924) (26.31808) (37.10964)
Distance (000s of yards) 2.748365 2.766901 2.720649 4.44328 1.884094
(1.407199) (1.436047) (1.362546) (.7512469) (.7001933)
Horse Runs All (N=183046) Hcap (N=115023) Non Hcap (N=68023) Jump (N=58417) Flat (N=124629)
Age (Years) 4.995012 5.453961 4.218955 6.877912 4.112446
(2.300088) (2.288042) (2.103686) (2.018053) (1.849477)
Implied Win Probability 0.1236974 0.1185883 0.1323367 0.1297913 0.1208411
(.1147714) (.0899741) (.1471023) (.1248645) (.1096053)
Summary statistics for 19,635 horse races in the U.K. in 2011 and 2012. Column 1 encompasses the full sample, with sub-samples relating to
handicap races, non-handicap races, jump races, and flat races in columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The top panel focuses on race statistics with
individual horse statistics in the bottom panel. The main measure is the mean, with standard deviations in parentheses. Implied Win Probability
is calculated as 1/(SP+1) where SP is the starting price odds (a summary measure of British bookmaking odds at the start of the race).
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Table 2. Favourite Wins
Dependent Variable: Favourite Wins All All
Intercept -0.3462837*** 0.3184456***
(.0231582) (.0638316)
Handicap Race -0.6229676*** -0.5503379***
(.0311138) (.0321488)
Jump Race 0.0941063
(.0618891)
Top Class Race -0.2304808***
(.0628121)
No. of Runners -0.0791053***
(.004999)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 0.0007709
(.0005061)
Distance (000s of yards) -0.0008574
(.0207323)
No. of Clusters (Meetings) 2812 2812
No. of Obs. Where Dep. Var. =1 6496 6496
No. of Obs. 19635 19635
Pseudo R2 0.0164 0.0294
Coefficient estimates when an indicator variable equalling 1 if the favourite won the race, and 0 otherwise, was regressed
on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the races was a handicap race, and 0 otherwise. A logit specification was used and race
control variables were added in Regression 2. (Races of class 1 or 2 are designated as top class). Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors (in parentheses) were clustered at the meeting level, and ***, **,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 3. Even Races
Dependent Variable: Std. Dev. of IWP in Race All All
Intercept 0.1525457*** 0.2218532***
(.000854) (.0018033)
Handicap Race -0.0653566*** -0.0560998***
(.0008375) (.0006971)
Jump Race 0.0077738***
(.0013661)
Top Class Race -0.0104103***
(.0013779)
No. of Runners -0.0081184***
(.0001291)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 0.0000548**
(.0000158)
Distance (000s of yards) -0.0004592
(.0004429)
No. of Clusters (Meetings) 2812 2812
No. of Obs. 19635 19635
R2 0.2736 0.4894
Coefficient estimates when the standard deviation of implied win probability within the race (our inverse measure of how
even the race was) was regressed on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the race was a handicap race, and 0 otherwise. Control
variables were added in Regression 2. (Races of class 1 or 2 are designated as top class). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors (clustered at the meeting level) are in parentheses and ***, **,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and
10% level respectively.
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Table 4. Sabotage
Dependent Variable: Saboteur All All
Intercept -5.380001*** -5.653535***
(.0584403) (.2031232)
Handicap Race 0.4022071*** 0.4535086***
(.068924) (.0761776)
Jump Race -0.9991198***
(.1480697)
Top Class Race 0.3106882**
(.105057)
No. of Runners 0.0114555
(.0086976)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 0.000268
(.0008139)
Distance (000s of yards) -0.1257629**
(.045342)
Age 0.0839837
(.0754047)
Age2 -0.0067511
(.0068603)
Implied Win Probability 2.628831***
(.1965811)
No. of Clusters (Races) 19635 19635
No. of Obs. where Dep. Var.=1 1099 1099
No. of Obs. 183046 183046
Pseudo R2 0.0028 0.031
Coefficient estimates when an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey was guilty of sabotage, and 0 otherwise, was
regressed on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the horse was racing in a handicap race, and 0 otherwise. A logit specification
was used and control variables were added in regression 2. (Races of class 1 or 2 are designated as top class). Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors (clustered at the race level) are in parentheses and ***, **,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%,
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5. Sabotage: Further Analysis
Dependent Variable: Saboteur All Handicap Non-Handicap
Intercept -5.193308*** -5.35927*** -4.113867***
(.2511909) (.334129) (.3911165)
Std. Dev. of IWP in Race -2.845232** -2.931033* -3.767819**
(.9779897) (1.491033) (1.342089)
Handicap Race 0.3299036***
(.086028)
Jump Race -0.9911507*** -1.457102*** -0.2327904
(.1491286) (.1947396) (.2467841)
Top Class Race 0.2878707** 0.2819007* 0.2649508
(.1048194) (.1368545) (.169955)
No. of Runners -0.0026094 0.0187636 -0.0472296*
(.0096455) (.0125658) (.01982)
Win Prize Money (000s of GBP) 0.0003986 -0.0012708 0.0008536
(.0008189) (.0020322) (.0008858)
Distance (000s of yards) -0.1208595** -0.0212889 -0.2905264**
(.0452715) (.053828) (.0943828)
Age 0.0831949 0.1023864 -0.0417721
(.0753054) (.0996865) (.1191283)
Age2 -0.0067912 -0.0096903 0.0104456
(.0068645) (.0090205) (.0104209)
Implied Win Probability 2.911083*** 3.639366*** 2.282971***
(.240468) (.3656254) (.3212462)
No. of Clusters (Races) 19635 11766 7869
No. of Obs. where Dep. Var.=1 1099 787 312
No. of Obs. 183046 115023 68023
Pseudo R2 0.0317 0.0338 0.0277
Coefficient estimates when an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey was guilty of sabotage, and 0 otherwise, was
regressed on the standard deviation of implied win probability within the race and the control variables from Table 4. In the
second and third regressions we break the sample down into handicap and non-handicap races respectively. A logit specification
was used, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered at the race level) are in parentheses, and ***, **,*, and .
indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 6a: Effect of Sabotage (Wins)
Dependent Variable: Winner All Hcap Non Hcap Jump Flat
Intercept -3.267838*** -3.291795*** -3.347433*** -3.256913*** -3.275038***
(.0112462) (.0155297) (.0189034) (.0196086) (.0138467)
Saboteur 1.080884*** 1.018631*** 1.181665*** 1.500179*** 1.01618***
(.0777645) (.0931589) (.145942) (.2016752) (.084767)
Implied Win Probability 7.115493*** 7.683576*** 6.946608*** 7.011645*** 7.182434***
(.0600003) (.0929683) (.0830522 ) (.0974899) (.076624)
No. of Clusters (Races) 19635 11766 7869 6631 13004
No. of Obs. where Dep. Var.=1 19635 11766 7869 6631 13004
No. of Obs. 183046 115023 68023 58417 124629
Pseudo R2 0.1372 0.0955 0.2042 0.1527 0.1293
Table 6b: Effect of Sabotage (Relative Performance)
Dependent Variable: Performance All Hcap Non Hcap Jump Flat
Intercept -0.2948265*** -0.328384*** -0.2375801*** -0.2654715*** -0.308028***
(.0012287) (.0015566) (.0017762) (.0020627) (.0014818)
Saboteur 0.1534108*** 0.1589217*** 0.1394553*** 0.1686466*** 0.1627182***
(.0068394) (.0083038) (.0115928) (.0173041) (.0073596)
Predicted Percentile 0.0056673*** 0.0063143*** 0.0045702*** 0.0059393*** 0.005596***
(.0000222) (.0000282) (.0000317) (.0000391) (.0000268)
No. of Clusters (Races) 19635 11766 7869 6631 13004
No. of Obs. 171991 108045 63946 48054 123937
R2 0.2954 0.3278 0.2403 0.3494 0.2826
Two sets of regressions to establish the benefits that accrue to the saboteur as a result of sabotage. The top panel displays coefficient estimates when
an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey/horse won the race, and 0 otherwise, was regressed on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey
was guilty of sabotage during the race, and 0 otherwise, and the implied win probability (as inferred from the odds). The full sample is analysed in
regression 1, with sub-samples relating to handicap, non-handicap, jump and flat races following. The bottom panel displays coefficient estimates
when Performance, as defined in Equation (5), was regressed on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jockey was guilty of sabotage during the
race, and 0 otherwise, and the predicted percentile of the horse (as inferred from an ordering of betting odds within the race). Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors, clustered at the race level, are in parentheses, and ***, **,*, and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1: The average win indicator for saboteurs (red), victims of sabotage (green), and
uninvolved third parties (blue). Averages are calculated for each subgroup, and for each
implied win probability (inferred from the betting odds) rounded to the nearest 0.01.
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Figure 2: The average performance (as defined in Equation (5)) of saboteurs (red), victims of
sabotage (green), and uninvolved third parties (blue). Average performance is calculated for
each subgroup, and for each predicted percentile (as inferred from the betting odds) rounded
to the nearest whole number.
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